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Abstract:
Limited access to low-cost financing is an impediment to high-velocity
technological diffusion and high grid penetration of solar photovoltaic (PV)
technology. Securitization of solar assets provides a potential solution to this
problem. This paper assesses the viability of solar asset-backed securities
(ABS) as a lower cost financing mechanism and identifies policies that could
facilitate implementation of securitization. First, traditional solar financing is
examined to provide a baseline for cost comparisons. Next, the securitization
process is modeled. The model enables identification of several junctures at
which risk, and uncertainty influences costs. Next, parameter values are
assigned and used to generate cost estimates. Results show that, under
reasonable assumptions, securitization of solar power purchase agreements
(PPA) can significantly reduce project financing costs, suggesting
securitization is a viable mechanism for improving the financing of PV
projects. The clear impediment to the successful launch of a solar ABS is
measuring and understanding the riskiness of underlying assets. This study
identifies three classes of policy intervention that lower the cost of ABS by
reducing risk or by improving the measurement of risk: i) standardization of
contracts and the contracting process, ii) improved access to contract and
equipment performance data, and iii) geographic diversification.
Keywords: photovoltaic; renewable energy financing; securitization
1. Introduction
Over the last decade the solar photovoltaic industry (PV) has grown
rapidly, gaining momentum from plummeting module costs, public interest in
sustainable energy, and favorable policy support (Branker and Pearce, 2010;
BNEF, 2012; IREC, 2012; SEIA, 2011). Taken together, in 2013 these
factors propelled the US to become one of only four nations to surpass 10
GW of installed PV capacity, 83% of which was installed after 2010 (Solar
Industry, 2013). Given PV’s ability to produce energy inexpensively,
reliably, and sustainably (Pearce, 2002; Prindle et al., 2007; Timilsina et al.,
2012; Branker, et al., 2011a), high levels of demand for new PV projects are
expected to continue. However, there are significant capital requirements for
transforming demand into installed PV capacity. For example, installation of
1
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3.3 GW of solar capacity in 2012 cost $12 billion (Barbose et al., 2013). If
market growth is to continue, solar developers require access to adequate
financial capital. This capital is not available through the traditional tax
equity market. Faced with both impending reductions in federal tax support
and stricter capital requirements on banks, solar developers are looking for
alternatives.
Solar asset-backed securities (ABS) are being explored as a promising
option (Bolinger et al., 2009; Bolinger, 2009; Wilkins, 2002; Pietruszko,
2006; Branker et al., 2011b). By delivering access to the more than $100
trillion pool of wealth managed by institutional and other investors, solar
ABS has the potential to lower financing costs, and expand access to funding
(Mendelsohn, 2013; UPI, 2011). This could be particularly beneficial to the
development of smaller scale solar projects, where the funding environment
is particularly challenging (Miller, 2012).
Though securitization has enabled other asset classes to successfully
attract financial capital, there are several challenges impeding its widespread
utilization by the solar industry (Herndon, 2012; Trabish, 2012). To facilitate
the introduction of this new asset class, policymakers must understand the
risks associated with different aspects of the asset, and look for ways to
mitigate these risks. This paper focuses on three points at which risk and
uncertainty affect the securitization process: 1) in the formation of the asset
pool where there is uncertainty over off-taker behavior, 2) in the process of
asset evaluation, and 3) in the purchase of the asset by uncertain investors.
By incorporating each of these well-known uncertainties in a simple
model, the paper is able to evaluate their impacts on the cost of financing,
and on the ability to raise capital through securitization. The model focuses
on the securitization of solar PPAs, using parameterization to assess the
importance of changes in key variables. A range of conditions under which
ABS can successfully reduce costs is also identified using the cost of
traditional solar financing as an upper bound. This information is useful in
evaluating the benefit of different efforts to promote solar ABS.
There are many ongoing efforts to enact or create policies that will
generate the conditions necessary for successful deployment of solar ABS.
These policies are reviewed, and assessed according to their targeted point of
impact. This allows interpretation of their potential influence on the cost of
raising capital through securitization. With the information gleaned from the
model, guidance is developed to target policies that play a significant role in
determining the viability of securitization for the PV industry.

2. Background
2.1 Traditional PV Finance
Since passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 the federal
government has used tax benefits to promote the solar power industry. While
the benefits are generous, equaling between 50% and 60% of a solar project’s
2
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installed cost (Bolinger et al., 2009a) much of this does not accrue to the
solar developer. Solar development firms are typically small and possess
little tax liability. They are unable to directly capture the value of federal
support and instead exchange tax benefits for funding in the tax-equity
finance market.
This type of financing is expensive, limited in supply and restricts a
firm’s ability to incorporate other forms of financing. In recent years, use of
a third-party to monetize tax benefits, has resulted in borrowing costs of 12 –
20 percent depending on leverage (Minzt, 2010; Sanders et al., 2013; US
PREF, 2011). Despite these high rates of return, the supply of tax-equity
financing is very limited. With fewer than 20 U.S. taxable entities (primarily
large investment banks, commercial banks, and insurance companies)
actively participating in the tax-equity market (BNEF, 2012), only $3 - $6
billion of funding has been available for the entire renewable energy sector
annually (Mendelsohn and Harper, 2012). For firms using tax equity
financing, incorporation of cost reducing project level debt is very difficult as
it increases risk for equity financiers (Mendelsohn, et al., 2012). These
problems have motivated firms to seek alternate forms of financing.

2.2 Solar Asset-Backed Securities
Progress is being made towards the creation of a large and efficient
solar ABS market that could supply adequate capital to the PV market. In
2013, leasing specialist SolarCity raised $54 million with their solar ABS
issuance (Parkinson, 2013). While this is a significant step in the maturation
of solar financing, it is quite small in size relative to the $800 million average
value of ABS issued in other asset classes (Mendelsohn, 2012). Replication
and expansion of SolarCity’s success depends on improving efficiency and
performance during each stage of the securitization process. Many policies
have been suggested in pursuit of this goal.
By considering the point at which these policy efforts impact the
process, it is possible to evaluate their potential role in the success of
securitization. Formation of the asset pool is the first point of intervention
considered. Decisions in the process of screening consumers, writing
contracts and pooling assets determines the quality of the asset pool as
measured by the rate of early contract termination. To understand how the
rate of early contract termination influences the success of securitization, the
process is modeled. The estimated cost of increases in the default rate can
provide guidance for policy intervention and developer action. Asset
evaluation by a rating agency is the next point of potential intervention.
Raters must assess an assets’ risk, but have limited data with which to make
their assessments. The degree to which their estimates are erroneous
influences the success of the securitization. Separating rater error from the
contract default rate allows for particular attention to the benefit of policies
focused on the rating process. Finally, the point at which the investor
purchases the solar ABS is considered. Rates of return reflect investors’
perceptions of the riskiness of the asset. Policies that lower required rates of
3
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return will reduce financing costs. The following model deconstructs the
securitization process revealing the specific roles played by three PV-related
uncertainties on the market valuation of a proffered solar ABS.

3. Model
Measurement of the cost of financial capital raised through
securitization begins with cash flow analysis. The solar developer’s, or
originator’s, cash flows depend on the performance of its PPAs. The
originator can hold these contracts for their duration, ensuring a long-term
annual income stream, or it can sell PPAs to a special purpose entity (SPE) to
raise immediate capital. The difference between the discounted value of the
cash flows to the originator and the sale price of the PPAs determines the PV
developer’s cost of capital (Stone and Zissu, 2005; Fabozzi, 2012).
3.1 Value of Discounted Cash Flow - Originator
Begin by assuming a solar developer originates m0 number of PPAs.
For simplicity, assume these contracts are identical, are originated
simultaneously, and have a 20-year lifespan (Cory, 2009). The rights and
obligations specified by the PPAs establish an anticipated value for
contracted receivables in the third-party ownership structure. Though these
contracts are complex, for modeling purposes they can be simplified to a few
essential components: i) amount of electricity contracted, ii) unit price of
electricity, and iii) recovery procedures in the case of contract termination.
Under the PPA, the consumer pays the system owner for 100% of the
electricity produced by the installed PV system. At the time of installation,
all systems are capable of producing an annual output of e0 kWh of electricity
per year. Small system degradation causes this value to decline over the life
of the contract. Therefore, annual energy output [kWh] can be rewritten:
(1)
where α is a constant annual degradation rate and t is the number of years.
The system operates at full capacity during its first year of operation.
Contract default is the primary source of cash flow uncertainty, and
impacts revenues by reducing the total energy output under contract.
Liability will fall on the consumer if early termination is the result of
consumer bankruptcy, sale of home, or purposeful termination by the
consumer in response to changes in technology or energy costs (Rahus, 2008;
CARICOM, 2012; FUTUREGEN, 2012). Under the standardized
residential PPA produced by SAPC, defaulting consumers are liable for all
unpaid balances, the cost of returning the system, and all costs incurred by
the owner in recovery (SAPC, 2013). The stringency of these default
remedies should reduce frivolous payment avoidance, but it will not stop
default in cases where the consumer is unable to pay. Under these
circumstances, full, timely recovery of payments due is highly unlikely.

4

T. Alafita and J.M. Pearce, "Securitization of residential solar photovoltaic assets: Costs, risks and uncertainty",
Energy Policy, 67, pp. 488–498 (2014). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.12.045

Given the uncertainty of the timing, and success of recovery
procedures, liability payments are not included in assessed cash flows.
Instead, for simplicity, a recovery rate of zero is assumed (KBR, 2012).
When a contract fails, the stream of associated payments is terminated, and it
is removed from the asset pool. Contracts fail at an annual rate of β. Actual
termination rates will reflect system owner characteristics, economic
conditions, and energy market conditions. Though these vary over time, for
simplicity the contract termination rate is assumed to be constant over the life
of the ABS. The total number of contracts at time t is given by:
(2)
where mo is the number of contracts included in pool initially. All contracts
are assumed to be active during their first year. Based on equations (1) and
(2), the annual amount of energy under contract by the pooled PPAs is equal
to:
(3)
Electricity prices are the final determinant of cash flows. A single price, p0,
is applied to all contracts. This price increases by a constant annual
escalation rate of γ, making the $/kWh price of electricity in any given
period:
(4)
Using equations (3) and (4), annual cash flows are given by
(5)
The total real value of the contracts to the originator is:
(6)
where δ is the risk-free discount rate.

3.2 Valuation of Discounted Cash Flow – Investor
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the entities involved in
securitization by providing a brief description of their rights and
responsibilities.

5

T. Alafita and J.M. Pearce, "Securitization of residential solar photovoltaic assets: Costs, risks and uncertainty",
Energy Policy, 67, pp. 488–498 (2014). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.12.045

Figure 1: Process of Securitization

As shown in Figure 1, each entity involved in the securitization process
requires payment (Stone and Zissu, 2005). Credit enhancement is the first
cost incorporated into the model. To achieve the high credit rating required
for an investment grade asset, credit enhancement is used to offset the
riskiness of underlying assets (Fabozzi, 2007). While there are many
potential forms of credit enhancement, overcollateralization is used in this
analysis. Under this method, the par value of issued securities is lower than
the value of the collateral (Fabozzi, 2004) - the more overcollateralization
required, the less capital can be raised from the asset pool.
Let θ be the amount of overcollateralization required. θ is the percent
of contracts set aside each year to cover potential contract defaults. It is
assumed that overcollateralization is always sufficient to ensure payment of
investor obligations. However, credit rating agencies are not always correct
in predicting actual default rates. Therefore, if θ is the amount of
overcollateralization required, the difference between this value and the
actual rate of early contract termination (β) will be:
,
where σ is excess overcollateralization. Separation of overcollateralization
into its required and its excess components allows closer consideration of
both the impacts of responsible contract issuance and accurate risk evaluation
by credit rating agencies on the cost of securitization.
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Credit enhancement is incorporated in the model in a manner similar
to β. ct , the annual cash flows included in the securitization, are given by
equation (7), where the number of contracts is influenced by
.
s

(7)
Next, servicing fees are deducted from cash flows (Wishnia, 2010). Let the
servicing fee be a percentage of annual revenues, η, so that the annual fee
paid to the servicing agent, Ft, is given by
(8)
This value is subtracted from annual cash flows.
Finally, the cost of investor return is incorporated in the cash flow
analysis. In equation (6), cash flows are discounted at δ, the risk-free level.
Investors require a higher rate of return as compensation for risk. If that risk
premium is given by μ, then the rate of return to the solar ABS is
.
When investor returns are accounted for, the present value of the income
stream generated by the PPAs included in the securitization pool is given by:
(9)

Because CABS must be sufficient to cover all ABS payment obligations, it
must be true that the present value of expected cash flows from the
underlying collateral net all securitization costs is equal to the present value
of the income stream from the ABS. Consequently, this value is also equal to
the market price of the securities (Zhang, 2011; Coval et al., 2009).

3.3 Cost of Capital
Internal rate of return (IRR) is used to assess the originator’s cost of capital.
This technique calculates the interest rate that brings a series of cash flows to
a net present value of zero. IRR is calculated as:

Reflected in the equation is the receipt of payment for issued securities in the
initial period, t = 0. This is a positive value equal to CABS. In return for
immediate access to capital, the originator foregoes the stream of cash flows
ct, over the subsequent 20 years. The cost of foregone cash flows is offset in
the final period by the reimbursement of any excess funds from credit
enhancement. Overcollateralization generates excess funds when the actual
default rate is less than the expected default rate, θ > β. Any interest earned
7
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on this accumulated capital is kept by the servicing agent, while the
remainder returns to the originator when all obligations are met. Funds in
this account are equal to the sum of nominal net cash flows in each time
period.

4. Results
There are three points in the securitization process that are of
particular interest: 1) the formation of the asset pool, 2) the process of asset
evaluation, and 3) the purchase of the asset by uncertain investors. To
assess the extent to which a securitization’s outcome is influenced by these
moments, three variables are analyzed - the rate of early contract termination,
β; excess overcollateralization required by rating agencies, σ; and the rate of
return required by investors, r. The model is parameterized and all other
variables are assigned fixed values. β, σ, and r are each assigned a range of
possible values and a sensitivity analysis is performed. Values are listed in
Table 1.
Table 1: Values of Variables Included in Base Case
Variable
mo

Units
Value
Thousands 100

α

Definition
Number of contracts included
in pool
Initial annual electricity
output of installed PV system
PV system degradation rate

γ

Price escalation rate

%/year

P
δ

Initial price of electricity
Zero coupon treasury rate

$/kWh
%

η
r
β

Servicing Fee
Investor return
Rate of early contract
termination
Difference between actual and
expected rate of early
termination

%
%
%/year

e0

σ

kWh/year
%/year

%/year

11,000 (EIA,
2012)
0.5 (Chianese, et
al., 2003; Jordan,
2011; Realini,
2003; Va'zquez ,
2008)
2 (Akins, 2009;
EIA, 2012b;
Shah, 2011)
0.10 (EIA, 2012a)
2 (Wall Street
Journal, 2013)
1 (Furletti, 2002)
6 through 12
0, 1, 3, 5, 7, 10,
15
0 through 8

β is appraised over a range of values from 0 to 15 percent per year.
This range is quite broad due to significant uncertainty regarding rates of
early contract termination. In the nascent market for home-based solar PV
systems there is only about five years of data on contract defaults for
8
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residential PPAs (Colmer, 2013). Incorporation of several options allows the
impact of changes in the actual default rate on the cost of capital to be
studied.
A similar range is used to evaluate σ. The value of this variable
depends on the confidence of credit rating agencies in their ability to
accurately predict the rate of early contract termination. It should be noted
here that the technical risk associated with PV technology itself is small, as
there are well-documented decades of performance data throughout the world
to draw on for predicting solar electricity generation rates and levelized cost
calculations (Branker, Pathak and Pearce, 2011). However, early contract
termination data is not as readily available. Give the absence of historical
data, their limited technical familiarity, and their narrow industry experience,
raters are expected to be quite uncertain. Uncertainty increases the perceived
riskiness of the underlying assets, resulting in higher rates of
overcollateralization. In this analysis σ is limited to 16 percent per year in
order focus on values at which securitization is a viable alternative. It is
anticipated that risk assessment accuracy would increase with experience.
To evaluate the importance of r, the rate of investor returns, values
between 6 and 12 percent are included in the analysis. In order to attract
investors, solar ABS must promise a rate of return sufficient to compensate
for the time value of money and the risk associated with the investment
product. The lower bound for these rates is based on return targets expressed
by mutual fund, retail investor, and pension fund managers during interviews
conducted by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF, 2012). As the
estimated cost of equity financing, 12% is the rate at which securitization
ceases to be attractive (Bolinger, 2009; Minzt, 2010; US PREF, 2011). It is
therefore selected as an upper limit on the rate of return.

4.1 Cost of Securitization, IRR
Table 2 presents specific values for IRR based on different
combinations of σ, β, and r. Using 12% as the approximate cost of tax equity
financing, Table 1 demonstrates that for many reasonably anticipated
combinations of β, σ, and r securitization will reduce financing costs.
Variable combinations that meet this cost reducing criteria are shaded. Given
the variable ranges specified, 6.12% is the lowest potential cost of financing
calculated.
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Table 2: Cost of Financing Solar Projects Using Securitization, based on
different combinations of β, σ, and r.
Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 0
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate)

Investor Return (%)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

6

6.12

6.45

6.85

7.34

7.91

8.59

9.37

10.25

11.22

7

7.12

7.50

7.95

8.49

9.12

9.84

10.66

11.56

12.55

8

8.13

8.55

9.05

9.63

10.30

11.07

11.91

12.84

13.83

9

9.13

9.60

10.14

10.76

11.48

12.27

13.14

14.08

15.08

10

10.14

10.64

11.22

11.89

12.63

13.45

14.35

15.30

16.31

11

11.15

11.69

12.31

13.00

13.78

14.62

15.53

16.50

17.51

Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 1
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate)

Investor Return (%)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

6

6.12

6.47

6.88

7.38

7.98

8.67

9.47

10.37

11.35

7

7.13

7.52

7.98

8.54

9.18

9.92

10.76

11.67

12.67

8

8.13

8.57

9.08

9.68

10.37

11.15

12.01

12.95

13.95

9

9.14

9.62

10.17

10.81

11.54

12.35

13.23

14.19

15.19

10

10.15

10.66

11.26

11.94

12.70

13.53

14.44

15.40

16.41

11

11.15

11.71

12.34

13.05

13.84

14.70

15.62

16.59

17.61

Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 3
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate)

Investor Return (%)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

6

6.13

6.50

6.94

7.47

8.10

8.84

9.67

10.59

11.59

7

7.14

7.55

8.05

8.63

9.31

10.08

10.95

11.89

12.90

8

8.14

8.61

9.15

9.78

10.50

11.31

12.19

13.15

14.17

9

9.15

9.65

10.24

10.91

11.67

12.50

13.41

14.38

15.40

10

10.16

10.70

11.33

12.04

12.82

13.68

14.61

15.59

16.61

11

11.16

11.75

12.41

13.15

13.96

14.84

15.78

16.77

17.79

Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 5
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate)

Investor Return (%)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

6

6.14

6.53

7.01

7.57

8.23

8.99

9.86

10.80

11.82

7

7.15

7.59

8.11

8.73

9.44

10.24

11.13

12.09

13.12

8

8.16

8.64

9.22

9.88

10.62

11.46

12.37

13.34

14.37

9

9.16

9.69

10.31

11.01

11.79

12.65

13.58

14.56

15.59

10

10.17

10.74

11.40

12.13

12.94

13.82

14.77

15.76

16.79

11

11.18

11.79

12.48

13.24

14.08

14.98

15.93

16.93

17.96

Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 7

Investor
Return
(%)

Credit Enhancement (% above default rate)
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

6

6.15

6.57

7.07

7.66

8.36

9.15

10.04

11.00

12.04

7

7.16

7.63

8.18

8.83

9.56

10.39

11.30

12.28

13.32

8

8.17

8.68

9.28

9.97

10.75

11.60

12.53

13.52

14.56
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9

9.18

9.73

10.38

11.10

11.91

12.79

13.74

14.73

15.77

10

10.18

10.78

11.46

12.22

13.06

13.96

14.91

15.92

16.95

11

11.19

11.83

12.54

13.33

14.19

15.11

16.07

17.08

18.12

Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 10
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate)
0
Investor Return (%)

1

2

3

6

6.17

6.63

7.17

7.80

8.54

4

9.37

5

10.29

6

11.28

7

12.33

8

7

7.18

7.69

8.28

8.97

9.84

10.60

11.54

12.54

13.59

8

8.19

8.74

9.38

10.11

10.92

11.81

12.76

13.76

14.81

9

9.20

9.80

10.48

11.24

12.08

12.99

13.95

14.96

16.00

10

10.21

10.84

11.56

12.36

13.22

14.14

15.12

16.13

17.17

11

11.21

11.89

12.64

13.46

14.34

15.28

16.26

17.28

18.32

Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 15
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate)
0
Investor Return (%)

1

2

3

6

6.21

6.72

7.32

8.02

8.81

4

9.69

5

10.65

6

11.67

7

12.73

8

7

7.22

7.78

8.44

9.18

10.01

10.91

11.88

12.90

13.95

8

8.23

8.84

9.54

10.32

11.18

12.10

13.08

14.10

15.15

9

9.24

9.89

10.63

11.44

12.32

13.26

14.25

15.27

16.32

10

10.25

10.94

11.71

12.55

13.45

14.40

15.39

16.41

17.46

11

11.26

11.99

12.79

13.65

14.56

15.52

16.52

17.54

18.59

4.2 Rate of Early Contract Termination, β and the Performance of
Securitization
When adequate credit enhancement is assumed, β is far more relevant
to the ability to raise capital, than it is to the cost of capital. Values
presented in Table 2 show that increases in β cause only a very limited
decrease in the number of potential cost reducing combinations of σ and r,
and have little impact on the cost of financing. For example, if σ and r are
equal to 0 and 6 percent respectively, a 5 percent increase in β from 10 to 15
percent increases IRR by only 0.04 percent. This negligible effect is a result
of the use of foregone cash flows, rather than potential cash flows, in the
determination of costs (Bragg, 2012). Because the default rate is the same
whether contracts are held for their duration, or securitized, the loss of cash
flow is not attributable to securitization and impacts cost mainly through
interaction with σ.
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Figure 2: Cash Flows from Asset Pool, given different Rates of
Overcollateralization (θ =β+σ)

However, securitization can also be evaluated by its ability to raise
capital from a given pool of PPAs. β is critical in determining the price of
solar ABS. By eliminating cash flows from the asset pool, early contract
termination reduces the value of the assets and lowers the potential market
value of the securities. This effect is compounded when additional cash
flows are diverted due to excess overcollateralization. Required credit
enhancement, θ, depends on the combined value of β and σ. Figure 2 shows
the nominal value of annual cash flows generated by the pool of assets under
different assumptions about θ. Though receipts in year 1 are the same under
all values, these payments quickly diverge resulting in disparate cash flow
profiles.
The impact of these alternative cash flow profiles on the value of a
proffered security is depicted in Figure 3. The higher θ, the less capital can
be raised from the pooled PPAs. However, changes in θ have a larger impact
on security prices when θ is low than when θ is high. Consequently, there is
a benefit to improving the quality of even high-quality asset pools. For
example, when r is 6%, by reducing θ from 4% to 3%, the originator can
raise an additional $77.6 million. The value of the same 1% decrease in θ is
$107.2 million when θ is reduced from 1% to 0%.
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Figure 3: Impact of Overcollateralization on Security Price at different
Rates of Investor Return.

4.3 Rate of Excess Overcollateralization, σ, and the Performance of
Securitization
Inaccurate risk assessment reduces the performance of securitization
by both increasing financing costs and reducing security prices. Figure 4
depicts the impact of changes in σ on the cost of financing at different levels
of β. The graph shows that rater inaccuracy always increases financing costs.
Additionally, it demonstrates that incremental cost increases are
progressively larger as the degree of accuracy declines. An increase in σ
from 0 to 1 percent adds 0.34 percent to IRR, while a similar change from 7
to 8 percent increases IRR by 0.98 percent (β = 0, r = 6).
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Figure 4: Impact of Increases in Excess Overcollateralization on IRR

Rater inaccuracy is also more costly when the quality of the asset pool
is low. As β increases, a larger portion of future cash flows are eliminated,
rather than set aside to cover potential losses, as they are for increases in σ.
Income accumulated as a result of this set-aside is returned to the originator
when all obligations have been settled. At higher levels of β, total cash flows
are lower; meaning the cost of setting aside the stream of income required by
σ is more costly.
Excess overcollateralization has the same impact on security prices as
the rate of contract default. Assuming that require overcollateralization is
always adequate, these both affect the security’s price by adding to the total
overcollateralization demand by the rating agency. Figure 3 illustrates how
security prices decline as credit enhancement costs increase.

4.4 Rate of Investor Return, r, and the Performance of Securitization
While the rate of investor return influences both the cost of financing
and the price of the security, its clearest and most significant impact is felt in
the cost of financing. If both β and σ are set equal to zero, then IRR differs
only slightly from r. In Table 2, when r = 6, then IRR = 6.12, and when r =
11, IRR = 11.15. IRR increases by approximately 1.01% as r increases by
1%. There is also an important interaction between σ and r. At higher levels
of σ, changes in r result in increasingly large changes in IRR. Because σ
measures the inaccuracy of credit rating agencies, this result shows part of
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the cost of imperfect information. Excess overcollateralization magnifies the
impact of increases in r, swelling the rate of increase in the IRR.
When investors require higher rates of return, the amount of capital
that can be raised based on a particular asset pool is reduced. The size of this
effect is influenced by θ. Changes in r have a larger impact on price when θ
is low, than when θ is high. In Figure 3, when θ = 15%, raising r from 6% to
11% reduces the security price by 106 million, or by 19.5%. When θ = 0%,
the same change in r reduces price by $402 million, or 31%. As a result, the
relative importance of θ and r in determining security prices depends on the
level of θ. When θ exceeds 11%, the security price benefit of reducing θ
exceeds the benefit of a similar percentage reduction in r. For values of θ
below 11%, greater price benefits can be achieved by reducing r.

5. Policy Implications
In revealing how changes in the values of β, σ, and r influence the
success of securitization, the model provides targets for policy intervention to
facilitate the development of an efficient market for securitized solar assets.
These policies are organized according to the point at which they impact the
securitization process. This helps clarify the policy’s intended goal as it
relates to the model’s results
5.1 Formation of the Asset Pool and the Rate of Early Contract
Termination, β
The investigation of the role of asset formation, as measured by the
rate of early policy termination, reveals two outcomes. First, when the
originator is responsible for providing adequate credit enhancement, changes
in the quality of the asset pool have little impact on the cost of financing.
Instead, the benefit of reducing β comes nearly entirely from the ability to
raise more capital from a given pool of assets. This implies that solar
developers have a strong incentive to implement and adhere to strict credit
evaluation procedures when issuing PPAs. With little need to use legal
authority to compel participation or compliance, policies to enhance this
process could be promulgated by a trade organization or an independent
industry representative.
5.1.1 Standardization
In 2013, the Solar Access to Public Capital (SAPC) working group
released three standard contract templates (NREL, 2013). They represent the
work of more than 120 member organizations, and are the culmination of the
widely recognized need for standardization of contracts and contracting
procedures (Colmer, 2011; Hu, 2012; NREL, 2013). There are two ways in
which the widespread adoption of a standardized contract would benefit solar
developers by facilitating the creation of high quality asset pools (reducing
β). First, creating a solar ABS market of efficient size necessitates the
pooling of assets across firms. Such pooling requires that contracts and
contracting procedures be standardized. Investors are looking for minimum
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transaction sizes of $100 – $200 million (Joshi, 2012), and prefer issuance of
over $350 million (Nelson et al., 2013). Despite rapid growth in the
residential third-party ownership market, no individual firm currently owns
sufficient PPAs to accomplish an issuance of this size (Colmer, 2013). Also,
there are a large number of smaller solar developers who could benefit from
the type of pooling possible with contract standardization. These developers
have had difficulty finding financing because investors are not generally
interested in projects of less than $30 million (Di Capua, et al. 2011), leaving
projects of 5MW or less without an effective small-scale financing structure
that can efficiently generate returns for all parties involved (Miller, 2012).
Next, standardization simplifies data collection and analysis. Such
data collection is necessary given the short history and evolving use of thirdparty ownership in residential solar (S&P, 2012). Standardization would
streamline the pooling of data to increase observation points, and expand
diversity within the sample, improving the potential for statistical analysis.
For developers, data analysis could provide feedback that would improve
credit screening and contracting procedures.
Data collected by the Connecticut (CT) Solar Lease Program provides
a glimpse of the potential value of establishing a larger database to track asset
performance. The CT Solar Lease Program, launched in 2008 as a publicprivate partnership, provided 855 leases to homeowners throughout the state
(Speer, 2012). The performance of those leases was tracked, creating a
longitudinal database that includes socioeconomic data on the lessees, paired
with their payment activity (Speer, 2012). If expanded to include a broader,
more diverse set of assets, this sort of data could be used develop credit
evaluation tools and standards. A national effort to collect and analyze this
data could draw from the example of two organizations, the Open Solar
Peformance and Reliability Clearinghouse (O-SPaRC) and the truSolar
working group. In 2013 O-SPaRC launched a national database for tracking
the performance of solar installations (NREL, 2013) following early work in
Canada to provide open access to data to assist the PV industry develop
(Buitenhuis and Pearce, 2012; Pearce, Babasola and Andrews, 2012). Data
collection relies on the self-interest of industry members to motivate
participation (Montgomery, 2013). A similar structure could be developed to
collect performance information. In another effort, truSolar, an industry
consortium, is working to establish a system for sharing asset performance
data within the commercial and industrial solar segment (truSolar, 2013).
Firms in the residential sector of the market could follow this example,
establishing an independent organization to collect and analyze applicable
data or work with established organizations like NREL.
As an important component in the process of pooling and information
production, firms are unlikely to need inducement to adopt standardized
contracts. Model estimation suggests that by aggregating assets to issue solar
ABS a firm can reduce their financing cost by between 5 and 13 percent.
Results also indicate that when the quality of the asset pool is improved,
reducing the default rate by 1%, the capital raised by the issuance can
increase by 6%. These potential gains provide firms with substantial
incentive to adopt standardization.
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5.1.2 Geographic Diversification
Though there has been rapid growth in the use of third-party financing
for residential solar, much of that growth is located in the state of California
(Joshi, 2012; SEIA, 2013). Geographic concentration of this sort exposes the
asset pool to the risk of significant increases in default rates in response to a
natural or manmade disaster, decline of regional industry, or change in state
policy related to solar. This risk creates a clear mandate for national
expansion. However, state policy variations make this change difficult.
Differences in state policy impede expansion of residential PV in
several ways. States have different laws governing utility contracts that
restrict allowable activity (Kwan, 2012). For example, there are only 22
states (plus D.C. and Puerto Rico) that allow the use of third-party PPA’s
(DSIRE, 2013). State to state differences also limit market expansion by
increasing the legal and analytical expertise required for market participation
(Burns and Kang, 2012). This drives up costs, and reduces developer interest
(Mendelsohn, 2012). Additionally, in many locations there is a perceived
lack of policy commitment. Changes in policy can undermine a project’s
financial viability making developers wary of investing (Nelson and
Peirpont, 2013). Taken together, these problems led Paul Durbin, a
renewable energy attorney to state, “…when it comes to renewable energy
development there are only a handful of states where you can get it done…”
(Lussenburg et al., 2011).
It will take the application of significant time and resources to
improve this situation. Unlike solar developers, states do not necessarily
have strong incentives to adjust their policies in ways that benefit the solar
power industry. Despite widespread support in the public for distributed
solar energy (e.g. more than 90% want greater reliance on solar) (Greenberg,
2009), policies and procedures in most states still favor conventional
centralized electricity generation and distribution. Inter-state coordination
would benefit from federal inducement, but in the current political
environment this sort of intervention is unlikely without significant political
change. Rather, it is continual pressure by interested developers that appears
clear to motivate gradual change, reinforcing the growing strength of a
maturing industry.

5.2 Asset Evaluation and the Rate of Excess Overcollateralization, σ.
Usually a rating agency would use historical data to forecast asset
default rates (Fabozzi, 2008; Hu, 2011). This data is not available for
residential PV PPAs. Instead, raters are looking for appropriate proxy data,
and are considering the use of utility or mortgage default rates (KBR, 2012).
While similar, these do not capture industry specific risks like technological
improvement, or home sale (Colmer, 2013). This reduces the accuracy of the
risk assessment, increases the amount of credit enhancement required, and
hinders the performance of securitization.
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Two approaches can be used to address this problem. First, the
industry can improve its data collection and sharing efforts. As discussed,
this can be facilitated by standardization. The model demonstrates that by
improving the accuracy of the risk assessment the cost of securitized
financing decreases. With contracts lasting 20 years or more, acquisition of
data will be a long process. The alternative is to reduce the burden of excess
overcollateralization by establishing a public entity to insure the assets,
reducing the originator’s cost of credit enhancement.
5.2.1 Credit Enhancement
Securitized assets use credit enhancement to attain investment grade
ratings. After the financial crisis of 2008, with the collapse of the mortgage
backed securities market, the cost of credit enhancement increased. Before
2007, clean investments could get a AAA rating with around 7% credit
enhancement. In 2011, the required rate was over 25% (Herve-Mignucci, et
al., 2013). When incorporated into the model, this rate produces an IRR that
exceeds the viable level. Government supported loan guarantees or insurance
could reduce financing costs by lowering the amount of credit enhancement
required from solar developers (Nelson and Peirpont, 2013). This would be
similar, although to a lesser degree and lower risk than the insurance backing
provided to the nuclear energy industry (Zelenika-Zovko and Pearce, 2011).
Federal credit enhancement has played a role in the development of
several industries. By providing a “first loss” reserve, the government
guarantees, partially or in full, the liabilities of a project towards its lenders
(Frisari et al., 2013; Mendelsohn and Feldman, 2013). This has been done by
both the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) - mortgage guarantees, and
the Small Business Administration - business loans guarantees (Sanders et
al., 2013). It was also used by the Department of Energy in 2005 to help
bring innovative, clean energy technologies to market through its 1703 Loan
Guarantee Program (ACORE, 2013).
A similar type of insurance could be developed to support the access
of renewable energy firms to public capital. By replacing existing tax
credits, which incur a dollar-for-dollar loss, with a federal insurance program,
it is possible for the federal government to both reduce costs and utilize
leverage to expand solar funding (ASR, 2008). However, introduction of
insurance would change the model and alter results related to the formation
of asset quality. By relieving firms of the responsibility for covering default
related losses, moral hazard is introduced and the incentive for firms to
maintain high quality asset pools is reduced (Herve-Mignucci et al., 2013).

5.3 Purchase of solar ABS and the Investor Rate of Return, r.
As the primary determinant of financing costs, actions to reduce the
required rate of investor return will directly improve the performance of solar
securitization. In the model, it is assumed that credit enhancement is
sufficient to attain an investment grade rating. If this is true, the principle
problem in recruiting investors is the lack of liquidity of solar ABS.
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Unlisted, non-standard securities that are not actively traded in any market
will require a liquidity premium, and will generally not be purchased by
institutional portfolio managers (Frisari et al., 2013).

5.3.1 Liquidity
Achieving sufficient scale will create liquidity, increase demand for
solar ABS, and reduce the cost of securitized financing. In 2011, it was
estimated that securitization of all residential and commercial rooftop
contracts could generate $733 million in bonds (Borod, 2013). Market
growth since that time would add considerably to this total. However,
securitizing many of these contracts would be difficult given their tax equity
structure.
When tax equity finance is used solar developers must typically offer
investors 15 – 40% of ITC benefits, MACRS benefits, and a share of the
project’s future cash distributions (Colmer, 2011;Marks, 2012; US PREF,
2011). This share can be 90% - 99% of a project’s initial cash flow (S&P,
2011). Tax benefits are taken over the first several years of the project
during the recapture period (Joshi, 2012). During this time, the financer must
be recognized as the owner of the asset and the producer of electricity
(Hechimovich and Stevens, 2012). If the sale of a PPA to a SPE for the
purpose of securitization interferes with this ownership claim, tax benefits are
lost (ASR, 2008; Hintze, 2013). Assets can be securitized after the recapture
period, but this can be five or more years into the project, and can do little to
relieve immediate liquidity concerns. It is possible to utilize securitization
before the end of this recapture period, by attaining loans backed by
developers’ equity positions. These loans could then be aggregated (Lowder,
2013). Even with this option, liquidity cannot be added quickly. However,
continued market expansion provides the promise of long-term relief.

6. Conclusions
Securitization of solar leases and PPAs has the potential to raise
significant capital, while reducing project financing costs well below the cost
of alternative financing. Realization of this potential can be facilitated by
policy action to target key points in the securitization process - the formation
of the asset pool, the process of asset evaluation, and in the purchase of the
asset by uncertain investors. Results indicate that actions taken at each of
these points can affect the cost and efficacy of a securitization. Using
appropriate policy to target each of these moments, the efficiency of the
process can be improved and associated input costs reduced. Though
addressing the problems identified will be challenging, with access to the
vast financial resources of institutional investors as the incentive there is
significant impetus for making necessary policy changes to expand the
deployment of PV technology.
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